After the definitive yes to the F-35 as the new combat aircraft for the Swiss Air Force, there is finally room for an in-depth discussion of Swiss security policy. A conceptual dispute between NATO turbos and neutrality friends would be beneficial.
A new era will begin for the Swiss Army as soon as the ink is dry on the contract with the US government for the procurement of the F-35.
The eternal quartet game for a new fighter plane is over. The opponents of the US jet F-35 reeled off all their arguments and slogans for the last time on Thursday: the US government in the cockpit, the Mirage scandal and the fixed-price offer from Washington. Americans versus Europeans. Bad bombers, no thanks. A little air police is enough. The final debate in the National Council seemed unreal, out of date.
Both councils have now confirmed the type decision made by the Federal Council: the Swiss army is procuring the F-35 as a new combat aircraft. Federal Councilor Viola Amherd, head of the Defense Department (DDPS), has been instructed by Parliament to sign the contract with the US government by March 31, 2023. The veto initiative from the kitchen of the group for a Switzerland without an army is rightly not waited for.
But a shadow hangs over the business: It took a brutal war of aggression in Europe to energetically implement a factually and politically correct decision. The F-35 represents a technological quantum leap for the Swiss Army. In addition, the Federal Council has left much more political freedom of action with the US system than with a European type.
France must remain an important partner
With the Rafale as a new combat aircraft, Switzerland would have leaned too heavily on France militarily. The French jet remains a niche product. The F-35, on the other hand, is becoming the standard platform in the western world. For the Swiss army, this results in significantly more opportunities for cooperation: multilaterally within the framework of NATO, but also bilaterally.
In addition to the US armed forces, France remains Switzerland’s most important partner, even without a joint fighter jet fleet. The two armies are already working closely together: in air refueling and in cyber defence. In addition, the Swiss army will in future be linked to the French satellite system “Composante Spatiale Optique”.
The “force de frappe”, the clout with its own nuclear weapons, forces Paris to operate an independent overall military system. That is why France continues to be strongly positioned technologically and industrially.
This will not change in the near future. With the special fund of 100 billion euros, Germany is only catching up on investments that have been overdue for a long time. The Bundeswehr is far from being able to keep up with the armed forces of France. The Austrian army will also remain weak for the foreseeable future. North and east of Switzerland there is a military void.
Maintenance of external relationships of the DDPS boss
But the western neighbor of all people is angry about Switzerland. The Federal Council has alienated French President Emmanuel Macron and his government: not with the decision in favor of the F-35, but with the contradictory signals that Bern sent out in early summer 2021.
One hand didn’t know what the other was doing. While it had long been clear to the DDPS that the F-35 had the best cost-benefit ratio in the evaluation and that there was no longer any leeway for political counter-deals, the other departments were still in talks with Paris. For too long France believed in a Rafale trade with Bern.
In an interview with the NZZ this week, Federal Councilor Amherd spoke of misunderstandings in the state government. She takes the internal communication breakdown on herself in a very self-critical manner. In the Federal Council, the dispute over the fighter jet is over. This is an essential prerequisite for closing the largest arms deal quickly and before dealing with the anti-fighter jet initiative.
Now that she has cleared the last hurdle of fighter jet procurement in Parliament, the head of the DDPS should urgently take care of external relations – especially those with France. The common interests far outweigh the differences in fighter jet procurement.
Cooperative, neutral and confident
While Switzerland and the EU are still unable to regulate their relationship, there is more leeway in international cooperation on security policy. Western countries, and France in particular, are dependent on a Swiss contribution to European security. From the perspective of Paris, the Swiss Air Force protects the weak eastern flank in the Alps.
The USA has once again given Switzerland strong resources with a very good offer for the F-35 and the ground-based Patriot air defense system. The head of the VBS, Amherd, is therefore in a good position at the headquarters of the North Atlantic alliance in Brussels for negotiations on a deeper partnership with NATO. Washington deliberately gave Bern preferential treatment.
Switzerland should remain a security policy constant in Europe. The framework conditions are also clear: the obligations under neutrality law form the basis of Swiss security policy. Even the smallest retouching has a difficult time. The idea of a cooperative neutrality has already fallen through with a bang in the Federal Council.
This does not actually limit the security policy options. Following Sweden and Finland’s applications for NATO membership, armed neutrality is almost a unique feature of Switzerland: Austria and Ireland are not comparable to Switzerland. This is a good prerequisite, especially for military peacebuilding. The Swiss army can cooperate, be neutral and confident.
Internal networking, external interfaces
Probably the greatest challenge of an independent security policy is technological progress. Modern weapon systems only achieve their full potential when combined. Therefore, a new era begins for the Swiss Army as soon as the ink is dry under the contract with the US government for the procurement of the F-35.
The new fifth-generation combat aircraft, a flying mainframe, must be integrated into Switzerland’s overall military system so that the capabilities of the platform can actually be used. The F-35 and the Patriot system are actually triggering a digital renewal of the army.
This is an opportunity for Switzerland as a research and industrial location to expand technological competence in the security sector. Because Switzerland, as a non-NATO member, is forced to set up an isolated solution for the highly networked F-35.
The goal must be to accelerate the so-called sensor-guidance-interaction: If the data vacuum cleaner has detected a target in the air, a quick decision must be made as to whether and how to fight it.
The air force and the ground forces will work together much more closely than before. This requires integrated management systems, possibly also in cooperation with the civil authorities.
Because in an ambiguous, hybrid situation in particular, the army, the police and other actors must have the same information and processes at their disposal. At the same time, interfaces are needed for cooperation with foreign partners such as NATO.
Dissuasion remains the army’s raison d’être
Switzerland now has the chance for a fresh start in terms of security policy. After more than ten years of fighter jet drama, the curtain has finally fallen. The existence of the Luftwaffe is secured. Security policy can free itself from the encrusted thought patterns of the 1990s.
It is no longer about the status of the army in state and society, but about the specific interaction of the various security instruments in different situations. Like other countries, Switzerland is exposed to disinformation campaigns. On the other hand, inner strength and a credible will help to protect one’s own sovereignty.
The most important means of strategic communication for this remains the so-called dissuasion. An adversary should be “disadvised” from attacking Switzerland: Being able to fight in order not to have to fight was a motto during the Cold War. The Swiss army must be able to keep a war at a distance.
Similar to the 1960s, a new conceptual dispute is now emerging: the NATO turbos want as much cooperation as possible, the neutrality friends from the right and left lack a common denominator. The formula is crucial: the more strictly Switzerland interprets its neutrality, the longer it must be able to hold out militarily independently.
War suitability remains the decisive requirement in all cases, especially in the case of cooperation. This requires the army to return to its core competence of military craftsmanship. After the end of the fighter jet debate, there is finally room again for dealing with the big, strategic lines of security policy.