Four weeks after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the outcome of the war is uncertain. But it is clear that old certainties have been shattered. What does the war mean for Russia and Ukraine, for the EU and Germany? An interim assessment in eight points:
Russia’s strategy has failed, but the outcome is uncertain
Russia’s President Vladimir Putin has gotten really bogged down. Looking at the means used, the invasion of Ukraine was aimed at a quick success. After four weeks it is clear: the strategy has failed, the Russian troops are making much slower progress than expected, and Moscow has not even achieved air sovereignty. But the army’s tactical errors and the outdated technology used are only one side of the coin. Added to this is the complete misjudgment of Ukrainian society. Far from being welcomed as liberators, the Russian troops are treated with hostility by civilians even in the conquered cities. In addition, there are high losses on the Russian side. The death toll may not be as high as reported by Ukraine, but an article in a newspaper close to the Kremlin may have given a glimpse of its true magnitude — as many dead as in ten years of the Soviet war in Afghanistan.
But the failed Russian strategy is by no means a reason for celebration. Not only because of the many civilian deaths that Ukraine has to mourn. The West also runs the risk of viewing the war too one-sidedly based on the reports from Kyiv. The Ukrainian army has suffered losses, including important military equipment. And Russia keeps gaining ground. It is therefore unclear how this war will continue. What if Russia can encircle Kyiv? What if Mariupol falls, if Russia can establish a land bridge between Donbass and Crimea? Will the invasion lead to an exhausting trench war? Or can Ukraine at least force Russia into serious negotiations? The further course of the war is uncertain. (ml)
Russia commits war crimes
Nothing to add, the facts speak for themselves. Not only did Russia unprovokedly launch a war of aggression against a sovereign neighboring country – which is a violation of international law from the outset. It also deliberately bombarded civilian targets with increasing intensity. The images of bombed-out blocks of flats and hospitals reduced to rubble and ash are dramatic. The bombing of escape corridors is cynical. The reports from Mariupol are shocking. After four weeks of war, millions of people are fleeing.
There are many allegations against Russia, especially from Ukraine – they have to be solved independently. Those responsible must be brought before the International Criminal Court. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that at least the latter will actually happen. Above all, the Russian President Putin, who justified the invasion with historical half-truths and ethnic ideology, is unlikely to end up in court. He is the main person responsible for this war, which has been escalating for four weeks but has actually been raging on Ukrainian soil since 2014. (ml)
Russia lost the propaganda war
Sitting at a desk, an old man explains why he is having the neighboring country invaded. Putin needs an hour for it, his speech is full of distortions, conspiracy theories and confused enemy images from the murderous ideologies of the 20th century. The monstrous telephone system on his desk also seems to date from this period.
Zelenskyy, on the other hand, only needs a few minutes on his first appearance after the start of the Russian attack to call the Ukrainians to arms. He speaks standing up and has been in touch ever since, both on his Telegram channel and in the parliaments of the world. Selenskyj does not appear in a 12,000-euro down coat, but in olive-green T-shirts or fleece jackets, his transmission does not consist of images from the previous year and does not break off in the middle of a sentence. Rarely is the division of roles between good and evil as clear as in this war. the majority of Russians may continue to think of Putin as a great statesman. In the rest of the world, he and his propaganda media lost the war. He’s a liar, who will ever believe him again? (hvo)
The European security order is no longer the same
The Russian invasion of Ukraine shattered the peace order in Europe that had existed since the fall of the Iron Curtain. All diplomatic attempts by the West have failed, and the hesitant behavior of Germany in particular after the 2008 war in Georgia, after the annexation of Crimea and the start of the war in Donbass in 2014 have proven to be serious mistakes. But at the same time, the Russian invasion has brought the West closer together. The EU has imposed sanctions against Russia, other countries have joined – only Hungary is proving to be a shaky candidate. Many European countries are supplying arms to Kyiv, including Sweden in a historic decision. Germany is doing its part – but still manages to make a fool of itself. Despite all the criticism, however, one thing is certain: Putin has not managed to split the West.
Even more: NATO, declared brain dead by French President Emmanuel Macron in 2019, is regaining importance – and is realigning itself. What Putin actually wanted to prevent, he only triggered with his war: the strengthening of the eastern flank. In addition, there is a debate about expanding the alliance to include Finland and Sweden – which are considering this step not despite but because of Putin’s threats. At the same time, it is evident that Ukraine is trying harder than ever to connect with the West. No longer as a NATO member, but perhaps as part of the EU. (ml)
Eastern Europe is finally being taken seriously
For years, Poland and the Baltic States have warned against underestimating Russia. Germany in particular was never interested in that. Against the declared will of not only these states, different federal governments first planned and built Nord Stream 1, then Nord Stream 2. Criticism of this was wiped away. There is still no official apology for this historic mistake, but it is now clear in Berlin too: the Baltics and the Poles were right. It would have been wise to listen to her.
In response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the EU not only moved closer together in terms of security policy, but in general. Because it is now Poland, Romania, Hungary and Slovakia who are taking in hundreds of thousands, in Poland’s case even millions of refugees, not only has the dispute about European migration policy, which has been smoldering since 2015, faded into the background. The question of whether the governments of Poland and Hungary respect the separation of powers in their countries no longer plays a central role in Brussels. This can be an opportunity or a problem. What is certain is that the importance of Eastern Europe in the EU has increased. (hvo)
Germany is equipping and upgrading
The turn of the century is the word of the hour in political Berlin. Olaf Scholz coined the term in his speech during the special session of the German Bundestag, three days after the attack on Ukraine. Using the term, Scholz deduced that Russia’s attack had turned everything upside down, which is why Germany too had to suddenly realign its foreign and defense policy. The announcement that Germany would invest an additional 100 billion euros in the Bundeswehr caused a stir, especially internationally, and dispelled doubts about the future direction of the federal government, which its partners had always suspected of being notoriously close to Russia, and with good reason. In fact, Putin’s Russia has already crossed various red lines in the past – from the annexation of Crimea to the bombing of Aleppo to the Russian state murder in Berlin’s Tiergarten.
The turning point consists above all in the fact that the life lie of German Russia policy was withdrawn from the change through rapprochement the last bit of foundation. It is unclear what the scope of the Chancellor’s realization will actually be. The rearmament plans he announced are subject to a partially skeptical parliament – and, as in the case of the purchase of combat drones and F35 fighter bombers, contain a number of projects that Scholz wanted to push through against his own party and the Green coalition partner anyway. Perhaps the turning point is just a window of opportunity. (shou)
The federal government is afraid of the voters
Since the refugee crisis there has been a political megatrend: the government’s lack of trust in the resilience of the citizens. Whether it’s wind turbines or Corona regulations, fuel prices or the fight against Russian aggression in Ukraine – unreasonable demands are avoided as far as possible, even when they are actually considered urgent. This fear also dominates the German government’s sanctions policy against Russia.
One must be able to withstand the sanctions, argue Scholz, Habeck and Lindner. “How many days would we be able to maintain that people can no longer drive to work, that we no longer have electricity in kindergartens, that we can no longer really keep hospitals running?” asked Foreign Minister Baerbock. But the matter is not as clear as the Leopoldina thinks. Rhetorically, the federal government has fallen into a trap. If the embargo comes after all because international pressure is too high or because the EU does not want to pay for Putin’s gas in rubles, then the traffic light will have a hard time calming public opinion. However, there is one ray of hope in the situation: the energy transition has become part of Germany’s reason of state. Climate policy is security policy. That, too, is a consequence of Putin’s war. (hvo)
Merkel’s balance sheet is in a new light
Angela Merkel’s departure from the world stage was mourned last fall as the departure of a guarantor of international stability, even more abroad than in Germany. Her personal connection to Vladimir Putin was considered valuable in containing the escalating autocrat. Less than three months after her resignation, Merkel’s foreign policy work appears in a new light: Under the Chancellor, Germany has made itself even more dependent on Russian gas with the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipeline projects, while Kiev’s warnings about the pipeline as a political weapon of the Kremlin were ignored – everything only “private-sector projects”, according to the terminology in the Chancellery.
In 2008, Merkel was still resolutely opposed to Ukraine’s admission to NATO. Although the German government had a hard time enforcing the sanctions imposed after the annexation of Crimea to its less enthusiastic EU partners, they obviously failed to impress Putin. Merkel, like her successor Olaf Scholz, has embraced the idea that Russia must be integrated as closely as possible internationally, including economically – and time and again alienated EU partners like Poland. When making decisions in the Chancellery, a clear distinction was not always made between the respective benefits for the German economy and for the European peace order. The fact that Merkel’s course was a consensus in the major parties and the central organizations of German business does not change the fact that Merkel’s foreign policy record is being reassessed by Putin’s war. The former chancellor will have to ask herself whether there weren’t enough moments when she should have reassessed Germany’s Russia policy. (shou)