As of this week, Russia claims it is withdrawing troops from the Ukrainian border and Crimea. What the West sees, however, are increases, 7,000 more soldiers have arrived in the border area. What does that mean and what course of action would be conceivable for a war? In an interview with ntv.de, Russia expert Stefan Meister explains which scenarios are possible for Putin and why.
ntv.de: Roughly estimated, Putin is now with 160,000 soldiers in the border area, with heavy artillery, combat aircraft, hospitals, ammunition depots. Does that provide the big cutlery for an invasion of the entire country?
Political scientist Stefan Meister heads the International Order and Democracy program of the German Society for Foreign Relations. For the OSCE he was an election observer in post-Soviet countries on several occasions.
Stefan Meister: That includes, among other things, the 30,000 soldiers in Belarus and the massive activation of the Black Sea Fleet. I share the US assessment that the deployment has now reached a dimension with which Putin could also carry out a major attack on Ukraine.
At the same time, he would be taking a high risk – because of the impending sanctions, but also militarily. The Ukrainian soldiers are more experienced than in 2014, and parts of the population also want to defend themselves. A guerrilla fight could threaten, battles with many deaths. Can Putin seriously consider this?
The scenario is in the drawer, it has definitely been played through as a possibility. However, it remains to be seen whether Putin will actually take this option.
And if he pulls it, is it worth the high price to him?
For him, there are other factors that we hardly include in our calculations: first of all, of course, the goal of securing areas of influence, of creating a buffer zone between Russia and NATO. Perhaps Putin also wants to become a historical figure as the one who brought Ukraine back. He sees that his population is dwindling and he needs more Slavs, there are also such discussions in Russia.
This means that an attack on all of Ukraine would not only be militarily feasible, but also not so unlikely.
If you see how Russian state banks and the financial system are currently practically preparing for the toughest sanctions and taking them into account, then you realize how far the Kremlin is willing to go to possibly take over Ukraine after all. It’s sort of a trial and error system with multiple options. Putin does not have an end goal “military conquest of Ukraine” that is planned in advance. Instead, he watches how things develop. When the time comes, he draws the appropriate option.
So the attack could start as a small scenario but end up in the big attack? If Putin then opens the big drawer at the right moment?
And if we didn’t react accordingly beforehand, exactly. When Russia says, “We are now invading Mariupol in the south and expanding Donbass,” then the reaction is crucial. If there are no or only weak sanctions from the West, the Kremlin will state: “Great, that worked, just like in 2014 or 2008. Then we’ll just go a little further.”
Would this scenario of extending the Donbass to Crimea be worth it alone? What if the big drawer stays closed?
By taking over Mariupol and parts of the ports in the south, Russia could secure supplies to Crimea and control the infrastructure. On the other hand, it would create chaos within Ukraine and also weaken President Zelenskyy. Thirdly, Putin would be in a better strategic position in the south for the other options that he could still draw later.
The benefit would therefore be clearly outlined. And the cost?
Such an attack from the Donbass would be the quickest, the simplest and therefore probably the shortest scenario. Even if the Ukrainians are militarily better positioned now than in 2014.
So quickly started, quickly over. As a reaction from the West, should Putin really not have to reckon with the very long list of sanctions?
If the West were to impose relatively weak sanctions, it would prove once again that it is doing nothing for Ukraine. If Putin makes a cost-benefit calculation with all these factors, then this option would be worthwhile. For me it is therefore the most likely scenario from the military possibilities.
Another option: Putin could annex the two separatist republics in Donbass. Would that be realistic and worth it for him?
An annexation of these areas was never the goal, but Russia always intended to leave both republics in Ukraine. Putin aims to federalize Ukraine with the so-called People’s Republics, in order to then give Russia the right to veto all decisions in Kiev with the help of these two areas. I see no indication that this calculation has fundamentally changed. The Duma’s demand for recognition of the independence of the two people’s republics serves to increase the pressure on Ukraine. But that would only be one goal, there is more at stake.
Namely?
It’s no longer just about Donbass or parts of it, it’s about Ukraine as a whole and keeping it permanently in your own sphere of influence. And that is also about the European security order and the role of the Americans in it. We’re now seven years further than 2014. At least Russia is further along, I’m not sure whether German politicians went along with it.
The West is threatening sanctions that would be much more effective than those of 2014. But the opponent must also recognize the effectiveness. Putin seems to be very isolated, has little contact with business and surrounds himself with people who share his perspective. How dangerous is that?
What is particularly dangerous is that he isolated himself even further during the pandemic, met fewer people and only had very specific access to him. I think that’s a problem. The economy and its actors play an ever smaller role in his considerations. The banks now only have the task of preparing for the sanctions, but they have no say in the matter, nor do the economy minister, the foreign minister and the head of the central bank. That influences the cost-benefit calculation on Putin’s side.
The Munich Security Conference starts today, and Russia is not there. On Tuesday in conversation with the Chancellor there was no rapprochement. Is diplomacy slowly coming to nothing?
Let’s put it this way: the Kremlin again does not use the opportunities to de-escalate at such an important event, but continues to exert pressure without speaking. Various offers have been made, but the Kremlin hardly reacts to them and offers nothing itself. If he wanted to de-escalate, Munich would be a chance to meet the right people. Over the next few weeks we will observe military pressure being exerted, then diplomatic efforts coming again, a kind of attrition tactic to extort concessions with a looming war.
Frauke Niemeyer spoke to Stefan Meister