Russia and Ukraine – one entity. That’s how Kremlin boss Putin put it. He has also outlined other cornerstones of his geostrategic agenda. The West does not have to accept them, but has to deal with them if a peaceful solution to the conflict is to be possible.
Russian President Vladimir Putin made a decision on Ukraine, it was said in Washington at the end of last week. As early as this Wednesday, Russia could attack Ukraine, US President Joe Biden and his allies announced in an announcement. These are extremely unusual statements, but they make at least one thing clear: the US government believes Putin is capable of taking this step. And she wants to forestall him in the struggle for the sovereignty of interpretation.
Exactly what Putin is planning, what goals he is pursuing, whether and when there might be an attack on Ukraine at all – these are questions that no outside observer can seriously answer. Neither do US secret services. Nevertheless, it is worth taking a look at the framework conditions that are causing the current Ukraine crisis. And on possible intentions of the Kremlin boss, some of which he himself explained.
An article by Putin from the summer of 2021, entitled “On the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians,” caused a lot of attention. In this he described the historical and spiritual unity of both peoples, but also questioned the independent statehood of today’s Ukraine. When Putin speaks of the “great Russian, the triune people of the Great Russians, Little Russians and Belorussians”, it becomes clear that the head of the Kremlin sees not only Belarus but also Ukraine as part of Russia, or at least as its central sphere of influence.
Regardless of whether Putin’s representation historically correct or stems from outdated, imperialist thinking – the article shows how important it is for him to be in control of key decisions in his western neighbor and goes beyond a mere restoration of Soviet greatness, which Putin is often accused of. Because of its size and geostrategic location alone, Ukraine is more important to him than other former Soviet republics in the Caucasus or Central Asia. At the same time, however, he denies the country an independent policy, with which Putin quite incidentally negates the existing European security architecture.
Security guarantees and world power
In this context, Putin also mentions the second central point without which the current situation cannot be understood: the threat he insinuates against Russia from outside. The President writes of “forces” that have wanted to undermine and separate the unity of the three Russian peoples for centuries. Applied to the present, it is an unsubtle allusion to Western countries, represented primarily by the USA and NATO. Even if the western defense alliance borders only a fraction of Russia, the perception of the threat in the Kremlin is different. “Moscow is concerned with strategic parity with the United States and with preventing geopolitical disadvantages that could result from NATO expansion,” says a recent statement paper of the Science and Politics Foundation (SWP).
The conditions that Russia has imposed on NATO show how important this aspect is for Putin. Again and again there is talk of security guarantees that the Russian President is demanding. Above all, it is about an end to the eastward expansion of NATO and the withdrawal of NATO troops from eastern alliance countries. Experts have repeatedly dismissed Putin’s claim that the alliance had previously given Russia such guarantees. “It’s a Russian narrative that you shouldn’t fall for. It’s just not historically correct,” said political scientist Carlo Masala the Deutschlandfunk. “Putin pulls out of his pocket in 2008 this alleged promise that was never made to say that the West broke promises,” Masala said, referring to the NATO summit in Bucharest, when Georgia and Ukraine were vague about membership was promised. The summit is seen as a breaking point in Russia-NATO relations.
But even if NATO rightly refers to Ukraine’s sovereignty and its right to freely choose its alliance, as well as the country’s security needs, as well as those of Poland and the Baltic States – only Russian security interests are relevant to Putin, so without appropriate guarantees there should be no significant easing of tension in the country give conflict. He can claim as a success that the NATO countries are considering security guarantees and even a moratorium, i.e. the temporary waiver of Ukraine’s admission, is under discussion. Chancellor Olaf Scholz summed it up in Kiev, using the formula that has been used in the West for years: Ukraine’s NATO accession is “not on the agenda.”
For Putin, this is a strategic success, but also an increase in international reputation: he is taken seriously as a negotiating partner. In any case, during his term in office, Russia has had a say in global conflicts, from Syria to Libya to Venezuela. The fact that this is important to him may also have something to do with his experience of the fall of the Iron Curtain, which he experienced in Germany as a KGB officer. The collapse of the Soviet Union, which Putin recently described in a documentary as the end of historical Russia, must have taught him a lesson. A distorted picture has long been drawn in the Russian media that portrays Putin as the savior who, after the chaotic, even humiliating years under President Boris Yeltsin, brought the country out of insignificance and turned it back into a world power.
retention of power and opposition
The longer Putin is in office, the more intense this narrative becomes, the more he refers to historical developments, but also to former Soviet greatness. At almost 70 years of age, he should also be concerned with his political legacy. This could consist of a new European security order that he wants to impose on the continent and that will guarantee Russia external power and influence.
A completely different question is whether this is thwarted by internal upheavals. Because that could also be one of Putin’s driving forces: In the face of declining popularity and domestic political problems, relying on foreign policy demonstrations of power and national mobilization. The narrative of Russia’s unity with Ukraine and the threat posed by NATO fit in with this, as does the persecution of forces supposedly directed by the West that are supposed to destabilize Russia – as they have allegedly already done successfully in Ukraine. There is no question that the Russian government’s actions against members of the opposition, human rights activists and the media have increased dramatically in recent years. Alexei Navalny and the Memorial organization are just two of the best-known examples.
The sanctions that have been in place since the annexation of Crimea and the Kremlin’s escalation in eastern Ukraine have damaged Russia and increased popular dissatisfaction, even if the country now seems to have come to terms with the situation. The economic situation is at least not dramatically bad and, given Russia’s large reserves of raw materials, it is not likely to become so anytime soon.
Nevertheless, displeasure with regard to Ukraine could increase. There, despite all the uncertainties, there is growing approval of a western orientation and the emphasis on one’s own sovereignty, especially among the younger generation, which only perceives the Soviet Union as a historical chapter. If the Russian threatening gestures cease, the country could stabilize economically and civil society, which in turn could rub off on the Russian neighbors. This, too, is a scenario that Putin must fear. Some observers therefore assume that he is less concerned with a war than with maintaining the threat in order to prevent this very development.
It is therefore by no means certain that Russia will go to war against Ukraine this Wednesday or later. Despite all the arguments that point to this, it also harbors great dangers for Putin, from financial risks to the threat of protests among the population to military failures in view of the strengthened Ukrainian army. But even if the Russian troops should return to their barracks: In the long run, the West is well advised not to completely ignore Putin’s motives.