So far, Russians have not followed the textbook

The kilometer-long convoy of the Russian army north-west of Kyiv was suddenly no longer in sight. The traffic jam of military heavy metal has moved. The symbol of the attackers’ seeming ineptitude seemed to have disappeared into the woods overnight.

On Friday, satellite images from the private provider Maxar showed new positions near Antonov Airport near the Ukrainian capital – including supply vehicles and, most likely, a rocket launcher in a covered firing position.

There can be two reasons for the displacement of the associations, which have been lined up on the street towards Kyiv for the past few days against all tactical principles: One possibility is excessive losses. The Ukrainian army may have ambushed the convoy with drones or anti-tank guided missiles.

Masses against all tactical principles

However, the second possibility is more likely: the Russian units have approached a new basic attacking position. This is supported by reports of increased fire activity by the Russian artillery in the past few hours. Fighting appears to be intensifying again after days of relative calm.

This would mean that the Russian army made a squadron change over the past week and is now unleashing the second wave of the attack. A good two weeks after the start of the offensive, this is within the range of standard behavior for mechanized formations.

Nevertheless, as the attack progressed, significant deviations from the textbooks of the Russian military academy became apparent. Most obvious are the formations of the thrusting tank companies. Instead of being isolated in a tactical line-up, they mostly drive on the road, often in dense columns.

In this concentration, the old T-72 main battle tanks are easy targets for the Ukrainian army. Wherever there is cover, whether in a town or a small forest, the defenders can fight the tank columns. Corresponding videos can be seen on all channels.

The term “special operations” is more than a euphemism

But to deduce from this that the invasion was poorly prepared and had already failed would be a short-circuit. The Ukrainian defense is effectively positioned, but the Russian advances continue to follow the original objective. Possibly slower than expected: not as “flowing water”, but as viscous lava.

The Russian army is therefore likely to have activated its contingency planning in the past few days. Apparently, the Ukrainians in the east of the country do not want to be liberated, as the military leadership in Moscow had assumed. It is to be feared that the next phase of the attack will be conducted with more severity than at the beginning.

In the first wave, intensive artillery preparations were largely dispensed with. The Russian army, on the other hand, relied on individual, targeted strikes against military infrastructure such as radar systems or airfields. This does not correspond to the usual procedure of the Russian army.

In the military context, too, there are sometimes semantic subtleties that provide information about the background to deviations from standards. The Kremlin has always called the invasion of Ukraine a “special military operation”. This term falls outside the usual systematics of operative thinking.

Relentless leadership principles

It is therefore more than a mere euphemism of Russian propaganda, even if it sounds inhuman in view of the brutal images from Mariupol or Kharkiv. Ukraine should be brought to its knees with connected pinpricks instead of the usual barrage of fire. Only with the strong Ukrainian resistance did the Russian army increase the intensity of its attacks.

The reports about the inadequate logistics would also fit this theory. Possibly the Russian planning was based on being able to bring the supplies to the occupied territories without any problems. How serious the problems really are cannot be said with certainty. After all, the Russian associations are still on the rise, especially in the south-east of Ukraine.

According to Western interpretation, Russian leadership principles are geared towards conducting the fight without interruption and maintaining as many reserves of forces and logistics as possible. It is particularly important for Russian commanders to consistently implement decisions once they have been made. They have a high degree of autonomy in the implementation of the order. The security of one’s own troops, the life of the soldiers, is a subordinate aspect in the decision-making process.

The time factor is gaining in urgency

According to the Kremlin, the main task of the Russian troops in Ukraine remains the demilitarization of the country. The Russian army’s ongoing advances are clearly aimed at destroying the Ukrainian army. That is why the focus of the actions continues to be in the south-east of the country. That’s where the majority of the Ukrainian combat units are.

Two pincer movements are clearly visible on the situation pictures. The Ukrainian brigades, which have so far blocked the front line of the separatist areas and the lost areas along the Black Sea, could be encircled. This trend, which was already evident a week ago, has intensified over the past few days.

After the suspected squadron change of the last few days, more operational artillery and air force fire is to be expected, possibly also more forces on the ground: new armored units, but also more fuel and ammunition. The spatial intention and the deployment of forces can be deduced from the available information, but not the temporal relationships.

It remains difficult to predict how much time the Kremlin will give its troops before they have to complete their mission. However, the economic pressure of the sanctions could result in an acceleration of the offensive. A Russian economic collapse before military goals are achieved would mean a defeat for Russian President Vladimir Putin in Ukraine.