The decision for the F-35 was correct. On the other hand, the attempt to combine dossiers without consultation harmed Switzerland’s interests: in relation to other countries, but also in terms of security policy.
The Federal Council is also finding it difficult to justify the procurement of the F-35 in a more robust manner because of its lack of unity.
In recent weeks, Europe is experiencing what was about as far away in the post-Cold War euphoria as the pandemic: a military threat as an instrument of power politics. Even without a Russian invasion of Ukraine, the European security order faces an epochal change. War as a continuation of politics is also conceivable again on the continent of prosperity.
But the security policy discussion in Switzerland seems to be limited to the dissonance of the Federal Council over the procurement of new combat aircraft. In non-agreed solo runs, individual federal councilors apparently negotiated a real reference to France as a counter-deal to the procurement of the French Rafale.
The choice of type was politically anticipated
Such a trade might have made Switzerland unilaterally dependent on a neighboring country that is pursuing its own power-political agenda. France uses the Rafale to secure its military influence – for example in the eastern Mediterranean, where Greece and Egypt are among the customers and clients of the Élysées.
Viola Amherd, Head of the Defense Department (VBS), only managed to pull through with the original plan with a great deal of effort and with the support of her Federal Council colleague Karin Keller-Sutter: the Swiss Air Force should receive the system that the armaments authority Armasuisse evaluated as best value for money. So the choice fell logically on the F-35. The Rafale, on the other hand, didn’t even finish second; it was occupied by a second US jet, the Super Hornet.
Of course, armaments deals of this magnitude always have a political dimension. This is one of the reasons why the Federal Council set clear guidelines for the later type selection when procuring the new combat aircraft: firstly in one Fundamental decision 2017 on the basis of the expert report «Air defense of the future»; secondly, with the planning decision on the framework credit of six billion francs, which was narrowly accepted by the people in 2020.
With the fundamental decision, only Western aircraft were allowed to be evaluated: three European, two American. If the Federal Council had wanted to link its European policy with the jets, this would have been the moment. In the Message on the planning decision the state government later stated that there was only room for foreign policy considerations in the case of offers of equal value.
The result of the selection process should not be turned upside down again, as was the case with the failed partial replacement of the Tiger. At that time, the Rafale had won, the US jets were not yet in the race. The VBS boss at the time, Ueli Maurer, explicitly wanted the cheapest offer – from a neutral country. With the Swedish Gripen he failed in front of the people. His successors in the department wanted to take fewer risks. This too is a political consideration.
Strategic thinking requires inner cohesion
The polyphony of the Federal Council shortly before the type decision in the early summer of last year is therefore astonishing. When it comes to strategic issues in particular, a coherent approach by the state government would be imperative. The solo advances of individual departments past the lead DDPS have unnecessarily annoyed France. After the failure of the framework agreement with the EU, this is all the more annoying.
The noise around the fighter jets points to a fundamental problem with some urgency: the Federal Council seems to have lost its self-image as a collegial authority. This also has to do with the fact that several parties behind the SVP have about the same amount of potential voters. The magic formula is in question.
In the run-up to the 2023 elections, this is obviously leading to even more silo thinking in the state government. This significantly limits the ability to think and act together, strategically. That is why the Federal Council is finding it so difficult to justify the procurement of the F-35 in a more robust way than with the slide rule.
This weakness benefits the initiative that wants to prevent the US jet. In view of the current situation, this is extremely dangerous. Serious military means have again become an essential currency for a sovereign state: for one’s own freedom of action anyway, but also to show solidarity and cooperation in the worst case.