Grandstand. Is the current energy crisis merely the logical and temporary consequence of a gradual renunciation of fossil resources or, more somberly, the beginning of a new era punctuated by periods of social instability, even popular uprisings, echoing a deteriorated geopolitical situation? Little present in the public debate, this question remains nonetheless central. What should cause us to wonder is not so much that the prices of raw materials can sporadically weigh on the social climate or that the control of strategic resources serves the interests of power: this would only be a development regrettable but predictable of history. That these social and geopolitical tensions are becoming widespread should, on the other hand, be worrying. That they interact would be an even more serious risk. Indeed, it cannot be ruled out that raw materials become a vector for subjugating the social state of one nation to the geopolitical inclinations of another.
The links uniting the price of raw materials, agricultural then energy, and popular demands are well known, as are those, uterine, of geopolitics and natural resources. From the flour war of 1775 in France to the hunger riots of 2008 in Africa, from the great miners’ strike in Anzin to the distress of the Venezuelan population, each crisis, each social revolt, has its own roots. Yet few are those that do not have the rise or fall in commodity prices as a catalyst.
The geopolitical dimension of raw materials no longer needs to be demonstrated either. If we think of oil and gas, we cannot forget that wheat has always been an element of conflict between great powers and that metals, the foundation of military power, are just as much the object and the means of interstate confrontations as one of the keystones of the peace of nations. This momentum continues: due to constraints weighing on the availability of so-called “critical” metals, the American and European agenda is now to secure supplies. But, on the path to carbon neutrality, this industrial policy will not be sufficient without adding three other dimensions.
“Gas Divestment Diplomacy”
The first is the implementation of far-reaching social policies to reduce the cost of the energy transition that households will have to bear. Like the “inflation allowance” or the electricity price shield in France, governments are aware of the risk of anger and act accordingly. But these cyclical measures could quickly find their limit. The demand for electricity will be growing, and pressures on the price of fossil fuels are to be expected.
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