Two days after the scenes of chaos that went around the world, the incidents that occurred on the sidelines of the Champions League final on Saturday May 28 continue to raise questions about France’s ability to host major international events in optimal safety conditions.
If he continues to attribute responsibility for the events that took place at the Stade de France, in Saint-Denis (Seine-Saint-Denis), to the British supporters who came “either without a ticket or with counterfeit tickets”the Minister of the Interior, Gérald Darmanin, expressed, on Monday, May 30, his “regret” for the spectators who suffered from the use of tear gas used by the police.
Sebastian Roché is a sociologist, specialist in police and security issues, research director at the CNRS and professor at Sciences Po Grenoble. He is also the author of the book Policing in democracy (Grasset, 2016). He explains how the use of tear gas by the police, without compelling reason or discernment, during incidents near the Stade de France on Saturday evening, is emblematic of the French police approach to a crowd.
What do the incidents at the Stade de France on Saturday mean to you in terms of crowd management?
What is striking in this situation is that the crowd was overwhelmingly peaceful. Fans gathered at the entrance to the stadium showed great self-sacrifice, including when the police screening system forced them through a bottleneck – only a few tried to jump over it Grid.
Another notable fact: British journalists tried, in vain, to alert the police to a certain number of malfunctions. French police officers are not at all prepared to dialogue with the public. They are not trained to send information back to their hierarchy to adapt a system to the reality on the ground. They also do not communicate with the public to explain what they are doing or what is happening. This communication deficit is chronic.
There is also the question of the use, let’s say “very generous”, of tear gas without legitimate reason or discernment. The use of this equipment by law enforcement is regulated by article L-211-9 of the internal security code and by section 431-3 of the penal code. In fact, these rules leave a fairly wide latitude to the police.
Is this an isolated incident or a habit?
We can speak of a habit. The incidents on Saturday evening are emblematic of the French police approach to a crowd. There was there, it is important to repeat it, a majority of people who waited with patience and resignation, and a handful of troublemakers. Yet all were treated the same. The problem is that the police perceive any gathered crowd as a homogeneous group. Hence its inability to neutralize only the perpetrators.
France has the most armed police in Europe, with an extremely wide range of weapons (LBD, disencirclement grenades, tear gas canisters, telescopic batons, etc.). Officers are trained to use them in so-called “law enforcement” contexts. This name is revealing: in the United Kingdom, we speak of “crowd management”, with the idea that we must preserve the peace.
In France, faced with an altercation, the authorities do not seek de-escalation, they send police officers into the field who make indiscriminate use of the means made available to them. In defense of the agents, this is what they are taught in police academy: to oppose a force superior to what they perceive in front.
So the problem is the brutal doctrine taught to law enforcement?
It must be understood that the problem is systemic. It is anchored in a set of rules, practices and working habits. I would add that the level of aggressiveness of the police is something that is modulated by their command.
When the prefect of police of Paris, Didier Lallement, was appointed in 2019, he did not hide his tough and authoritarian approach to the function. He assumes to be there to maintain order whatever the cost and regardless of the number of injured in the demonstrations or the discontent he arouses. A prefect is appointed to a territorial post by decree signed by the President of the Republic, in the Council of Ministers, and on the proposal of the Prime Minister. If Didier Lallement is still in place, it is because his leadership style is politically validated by the executive power.
From when does this doctrine of all-repressive date?
The increased use by the police of weapons such as LBDs or grenades dates back fifteen years. It started under the mandate of Nicolas Sarkozy (2007-2012), but the effects could not be seen until much later – in particular during the demonstrations of the “yellow vests” in 2018. Over time, the development of certain practices on the ground contributed to creating a logic that established this all-repressive model.
This model is very bad – both for the police institution and for the political institution – insofar as it is based on a confrontational approach that does not take into account simple democratic principles (such as accountability to citizens or respect for rights). This doctrine is quite simply out of step with the democratic aspirations of Western societies. The real question is: what font do we need? And above all, at what cost? We saw this weekend the corrosive effect that bad police can have on a country’s reputation.
How to get out of this model and go beyond this doctrine?
It is difficult because it requires a broad political reflection that goes well beyond the use of tear gas or LBDs. How do you choose to apprehend a crowd? What are the rights of citizens? What are the police? If the senior police hierarchy and politicians do not have clear answers to these questions, things will not change. It is not the police officers themselves who will impose limits on themselves or seek to reinvent the code of ethics of their profession.
As such, the Beauvau de la sécurité, launched at the beginning of 2021, has given rise to an embryo of reflection. The announced great debate was cut short, but it had the merit of creating a precedent: for the first time, we tried to think of the police with a political reading grid, and not only on a technical level.
What countries could we draw inspiration from, elsewhere in Europe, in order to better manage crowds?
Some European countries – such as the United Kingdom, Belgium or Germany – have succeeded in bringing the excesses of supporters under control thanks, in particular, to the establishment of regular contact between the clubs and the authorities. In France, the National Division for the Fight against Hooliganism (DNLH) has also been inspired by this method in certain cities. In Strasbourg and Lille, for example, members of the Departmental Directorate of Public Security (DDSP) are in contact with clubs and supporters’ associations to better anticipate crowd management during matches. It works and shows the importance of better communication up front.
In situations too, it is clear that good communication allows the establishment of de-escalation mechanisms. In the United Kingdom and Germany, police teams are in charge of communication in the field and reporting information in order to adjust the system if necessary.