William Assanvo is a researcher in the West Africa, Sahel and Lake Chad regional office of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). In a report published Monday September 18it analyzes the links between violent extremist groups and licit and illicit socio-economic activities in the northeast of Côte d’Ivoire between 2019 and 2022.
The jihadist threat from the Sahel has spread in recent years towards the northern border areas of the coastal countries of West Africa. What are the violent extremist groups identified in the north of Côte d’Ivoire, and more particularly in the northeast?
William Assanvo None of the attacks that have been carried out in this part of the country have been claimed. But, according to police investigations, it is the name of the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (GSIM), a subsidiary of Al-Qaeda in the region, which comes up. And in particular groups linked to katiba Macina – active in central Mali and part of Burkina Faso – and the group of Burkinabe origin Ansarul Islam.
How did the jihadists manage to integrate into the local economic fabric?
To carry out their activities and expand, all these groups have basic and operational needs to satisfy. They need not only food and medicine, but also fuel, motorcycles, weapons, ammunition, chemical fertilizers for the manufacture of explosive devices… They find the means to obtain them by getting involved in socio-economic activities, which are often illicit, but not only that.
We have mainly focused on the economy of live cattle and illegal gold panning. In the first case, there was a form of blackmail, even intimidation. If breeders wanted to keep their animals, they were forced to place themselves under the protection of these groups, who expected certain services from them in return. Remember that they operate in the border region between Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso. It is an isolated area, where the State had little presence, and where the populations were faced with all kinds of vulnerabilities.
Was there any resistance on site?
Yes, some residents left the area to escape insecurity and pressure, and moved further south. But many stayed, for lack of alternative. Despite the blackmail, expressed more or less explicitly, the jihadists were not always in a posture of oppression, and residents collaborated to protect their socio-economic activity, protect themselves and their families. Especially since armed groups often offer financing for the purchase and sale of livestock in exchange for an annual contribution, in cash or in kind.
For the jihadists, these connections are very useful: they allow them to benefit from a network of commercial partners, who provide them with information and supplies, as well as substantial financial gains. We also cannot exclude that some of these actors adhered to the groups’ rhetoric. An association facilitated by community ties and the fact that there was no question of taking up arms.
Is the dynamic the same for gold panning?
Yes. Even if the presence of jihadists slowed down activity, illegal gold panning continued in the area, which suggests forms of understanding between the two parties. The armed groups allowed the gold miners who worked with them to continue their activities without fear of reprisals. The resulting collaboration was also based on funding proposals.
You also indicate in the study that these jihadist groups collaborate with several communities…
Indeed. We generally focus, wrongly, on the Fulani. However, jihadists manage to cast a wide net and join forces with members of other communities. The community logic exists, but superimposed on it is a logic that can be described as functional: the priority for jihadists is to satisfy their needs. Among the people who contributed to the supply networks set up, we were able to identify Lobi and Mossi in particular.
After the series of terrorist attacks recorded between 2020 and 2021, the northeast of Côte d’Ivoire is experiencing a period of calm. How could the Ivorian government take advantage of it with the aim of drying up the sources of income and recruitment channels of extremist groups?
We tend to focus on the attacks, and when there are none, we have the illusion that the problem has been contained, or even resolved. This relative calm on the security level should encourage us to take an interest in the invisible dynamics at work linked to the financing, recruitment and supply of groups.
For the livestock economy, it is important to enforce Ivorian regulations on transhumance and the movement of animals, by strengthening traceability and control of the origin of animals. For illegal gold mining, efforts have been made in recent years in the areas of security and regulation, but the results have not yet been achieved.
Have the regime changes in Mali and Burkina made the fight against jihadist groups in the north more complex?
The socio-political situation in Mali and Burkina Faso has had an impact on cooperation with Côte d’Ivoire, particularly on the military and security levels. If this cooperation has been up and down with Burkina Faso over the last twenty months, it has significantly weakened with Mali, even more so due to the crisis over the 49 Ivorian soldiers detained in Bamako. between July 2022 and January 2023.
The difficulty for the transitional authorities in Burkina Faso in dealing with the multiplicity of fronts that have emerged over the past seven years has not allowed them to give their common border area the attention that Côte d’Ivoire would have wished to see him wear it. The absence of an effective and concerted response, particularly on the Burkinabe side, has played a role in the persistence of a source of insecurity which threatens the north of Côte d’Ivoire, in the same way as socio-economic and security specific to this region.
Are these terrorist groups threatening Abidjan today?
That Abidjan could be considered a target for terrorist groups is a possibility that cannot be ruled out. Recall that in 2018 and 2019, there were press reports suggesting possible plans for attacks against several locations in Abidjan. It is the heart of power and political, administrative and socio-economic activities in Côte d’Ivoire and, in this sense, it is an important symbol. An attack in the city would represent a significant coup for the group responsible. The fact that the threat has been concentrated in recent years in the northeast border area does not exclude this risk.