Une question always arises in crisis situations: why did no one see it coming? In 2008, Queen Elizabeth II, in the midst of the global financial crisis, asked why no one had predicted the fragility of the global financial system. A little over ten years later, Germany is looking for its answer to the same kind of question. The danger posed by Russia for peace in Europe, but also for the social and economic stability of Germany, remained poorly appreciated until the end. The causes of collective recklessness will have to be analyzed in the years to come. However, the rhetoric of the epochal change should not obscure the fact that even after February 24, German policy continued from faulty premises on central issues.
Concretely, Berlin politics had to answer two crucial questions after Putin’s brutal attack on Ukraine. First, what role can arms deliveries play in the development of war? Secondly, what is the price to pay to regain German energy independence from Russia in the short term? Regarding the first question, the prevailing view in Berlin has long been that Ukraine could not win the war, even with large Western arms shipments. The idea of letting Germany become a participant in a potentially nuclear conflict for a losing battle could therefore be comfortably dismissed. After more than six months of war, this view has proven to be wrong. Thanks to excellent training and Western weapons, the armed forces of kyiv were able to stop Russian aggression and even regain considerable territory.
Also for the second question, Berlin’s policy started from erroneous premises. The German government spoke of a “mass poverty” and an economic collapse of more than 10% in the event of an interruption in Russian gas deliveries – much more than during the global financial crisis or the Covid-19 pandemic, for example. Berlin was visibly impressed by Putin’s threats and warnings from certain interest groups. Russia has since stopped its gas deliveries and we are now wiser. Gas consumption in the production sector fell by just over 20% compared to the previous year. But production has remained roughly stable so far, and reservoirs continue to fill. No doubt: the next few months will be difficult, but with realistic savings and the right policy, Germany can go through the winter without Russian energy. In the end, therefore, Berlin was also wrong on these two decisive military and economic issues. In both cases, precious months passed before the government painfully corrected the situation.
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