Friday, August 5, in the middle of the afternoon, the Israeli army attacked the Gaza Strip, targeting in particular a building in a residential area, in the city center. These strikes, followed by other salvos a few hours later, then by shelling in the night, killed Tayssir Al-Jabari, commander of the Al-Quds Brigades, the armed wing of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the movement which, with Hamas controls the Palestinian enclave.
Finally, Sunday, August 7, shortly after 11:30 p.m., Israel and Islamic Jihad silenced the guns after mediation by Egypt. A precarious ceasefire, for which the Islamist movement says it has obtained “the Egyptian commitment to work for the release of two prisoners” : Khalil Awawdeh, detained without charge, in failing health after almost 150 days of hunger strike, and Bassam Al-Saadi, head of Islamic Jihad in the occupied West Bank.
Political scientist Leïla Seurat, researcher at the Arab Center for Research and Political Studies (CAREP) and associated with the Center for Sociological Research on Law and Penal Institutions (CESDIP), discusses the origins of this movement and the relationships it maintains with Hamas, both competitor and ally of convenience.
For what purpose was the Palestinian Islamic Jihad founded?
Islamic Jihad was founded in the late 1970s by Fathi Shiqaqi, a Palestinian initially close to the Muslim Brotherhood organization, but who gradually distanced himself from it by denouncing its lack of commitment to the national liberation struggle. . He also criticizes the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) for its secularist approach. The JIP, conceived from the outset as a third way, was founded in opposition to these two movements.
At the base, the Islamic Jihad is composed of former members of the Muslim Brotherhood and a formation belonging to Fatah [le parti du président de l’Autorité palestinienne, Mahmoud Abbas]. He advocates the establishment of a Palestinian Islam that is both patriotic and revolutionary. More broadly, its political offer is part of a regional context of discrediting Baathism and Pan-Arabism. [qui visent à unifier les peuples arabes]exacerbated by the Syrian intervention against the PLO in Lebanon in 1976. It is also necessary to take into account the emergence at this time of the Islamic revolution in Iran which nourishes the anticolonial theses of Fathi Shiqaqi and reinforces him in the idea of build another option to liberate the territories conquered by Israel.
The ideological hybridity of the movement, both Sunni and strongly inspired by Shiism, leads it to distance itself from both Fatah and Hamas, displaying its neutrality and working as much as possible for the unification of the Palestinian ranks.
What are the relations between Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas?
As early as 2006, the Islamic Jihad reproached Hamas for its participation in the Palestinian legislative elections and its entry into the institutions of the Palestinian Authority. Unlike Hamas, Islamic Jihad has no intention of exercising political power. In 2007, the takeover of the Gaza Strip by Hamas led it to seek to consolidate its truce with Israel. This situation imposes an increased control on the other factions which want to confront Israel militarily, in the forefront of which the Islamic Jihad.
Depending on the context, Hamas has more or less imposed this control, often letting Islamic Jihad operate, or even allying with it. This was the case in August 2011 when several rockets were fired at towns in southern Israel by the Al-Quds Brigades [la branche armée du JIP] and by Hamas’ Al-Qassam Brigades. The two military organizations had announced in a joint communiqué the bombardment of the settlement of Ofakim in response to the assassination of a leader of the Popular Resistance Committees.
Islamic Jihad can, however, be a problem for Hamas, simply because it threatens its prestige. This competition was particularly observed during the Israeli aggression of November 2012. Islamic Jihad for the first time sent a rocket with a range of 70 kilometers towards Tel Aviv, which was immediately followed by a another shot by Hamas’ Al-Qassam Brigades.
But this competition could not elude the coordination between the two movements which, more often than not, display their solidarity during the signing of truces affirming the victory of all the factions of the resistance. Since 2018, all the armed factions have also been represented in a common chamber of military operations.
What about relations between the PIJ and the Palestinian Authority?
Islamic Jihad does not recognize Palestinian Authority institutions that have entered into security coordination with Israel. On the other hand, it seeks, like Hamas, to integrate the PLO and to reactivate this structure around new bases.
What is Israel’s strategy vis-à-vis these two movements?
Israel has long held Hamas responsible for rockets fired by other factions from the Gaza Strip, regularly targeting Al-Qassam Brigades fighters for actions carried out by others, including Islamic Jihad.
Regularly, Israel exploits the relations between these two movements by assassinating the leaders of Islamic Jihad (in 2011 and 2019) to test the reaction of Hamas. The latter, although attached to the truce, is most often forced to let Islamic Jihad respond to the assassinations of its leaders.
The latest Israeli aggression seems to show a notable development: Israel does not seem to consider Hamas responsible for the 500 rockets fired during the three days of the confrontation. At no time did Israel target Hamas. This relative tolerance seems to be part of a renewal of the strategy of dividing the ranks of the resistance after the battle called “the sword of Jerusalem”. In 2021, the emergence of a common front of all Palestinian factions during this battle was experienced as a real trauma by Israel.
By officially naming Islamic Jihad as the main enemy and asking Hamas to choose between “terrorists” of the Islamic Jihad and the civilian population in Gaza, Israel is trying to undermine the common front that emerged in this battle. It is too early to know how effective this divisive strategy will prove.
And the fact remains that this latest Israeli aggression has, once again, put Hamas in difficulty which, attached to holding a truce, sees its legitimacy as a resistance movement somewhat tainted.
Is the Palestinian Islamic Jihad supported by the people of Gaza?
The movement enjoys considerable popularity with the Palestinian population, not only in Gaza – not being in power, the PIJ has not suffered from the depreciation of its image, like Hamas –, but also in the West Bank.
Does the Palestinian Islamic Jihad have allies in the region?
Islamic Jihad receives significant economic and military aid from Iran. Unlike Hamas, it did not close its offices in Damascus following the Syrian uprising in 2011. Nor did it criticize Hezbollah for its involvement in the fighting in Syria. However, the Islamic Jihad cannot be considered as a “proxy” of Iran. In recent years, he has displayed his independence from Tehran on several issues. This is the case, for example, of the war in Yemen: while the Iranians had pressed the Islamic Jihad to align themselves with their position, its leaders refused to do so – which would have cost them a lower price. economic support from the Islamic Republic. The Islamic Jihad insists at all costs on displaying its autonomy and its non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
Also, if it is ideologically close to Iran, the Islamic Jihad insists on the Sunni nature of its organization. While some sources mention the conversions to Shiism of its members, its leaders regularly take care to clarify things: a Shiite cannot officially be part of the organization, which remains of Sunni obedience, even if bridges are possible.