Why Western Sahara has been at the center of Moroccan diplomacy for forty-eight years

The formalization by Israel, on July 17, of its recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara is the last step in the process of normalizing relations between the two countries. North African extension of the Abraham Accords, the decision of the Cherifian kingdom to establish diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv in December 2020 was part of a “deal” triangular with the United States, the latter recognizing the “Moroccanity” of the former Spanish colony in exchange for the Moroccan gesture. Tel Aviv is now following in their footsteps, completing the dynamic of bilateral rapprochement. Israel can now count in the Maghreb on a de facto alliance with Morocco, which has made the legitimation of its sovereignty over what it calls its “southern provinces”.

The former Spanish colony and its 266,000 km² of desert landscape are today still considered by the UN as a “non-self-governing territory”. Since 1975, Morocco and the separatists of the Polisario Front have been fighting over sovereignty. If Morocco controls 80% of the territory, the Polisario calls for the holding of a self-determination referendum, in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions, and has formed a “Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic” (SADR). It is sheltered in the refugee camps of Tindouf, in western Algeria, a country which provides it with political and military aid.

After the clashes triggered by the departure of the Spanish tutor in 1975, the security situation had stabilized following a ceasefire concluded in 1991 under the aegis of the UN. The lull was, however, broken at the end of 2020 when Moroccan forces entered the Guerguerat area, a buffer space under Polisario control. Since then, the border has become volatile again, the scene of deadly skirmishes.

For the Moroccan monarchy, the recognition of its sovereignty over this territory is above all symbolic. Claiming the historic allegiance of local tribes to the Alawite Empire, Rabat considers Western Sahara its own. “The Western Sahara struggle is gradually becoming a lever of Moroccan nationalism for the monarchy”, explains Luis Martinez, director of research at Sciences Po and specialist in North Africa. Initially supported by the nationalist parties, the cause was then seized by the palace. Under the impetus of King Hassan II, in 1975, the “green march” had mobilized 350,000 Moroccans to join the disputed area. “The entire Moroccan population considers the Sahara as part of Morocco”, warns the Spanish journalist Ignacio Cembrero, ofEl Confidential, very good connoisseur of the Cherifian kingdom. Rare are the dissonant voices to be heard publicly in Morocco on this issue.

An ambiguous French positioning

On the other hand, on the African scene, the consensus is still far from having been found. In 1984, under the reign of Hassan II, Morocco left the Organization of African Unity (OAU, ancestor of the African Union) following the latter’s decision to admit the SADR as a “member”, a status which amounts to recognizing its status as a sovereign state. Thirty-three years later, in 2017, his son, King Mohammed VI, had changed his diplomatic strategy, choosing to rejoin the bodies of the African Union (AU) to have his autonomy plan accepted. “It seemed contradictory to be influential in Africa while being absent from the AU”analyzes Khadija Mohsen-Finan, political scientist specializing in the Maghreb and the Arab world.

The “Tangier appeal”, launched at the end of 2022 to plead for the exclusion of the SADR from the AU with its allies, illustrates this new Moroccan approach. The success is partial. “Many French-speaking African countries [comme le Sénégal, la Côte d’Ivoire ou le Gabon] support the Moroccan plan in the Sahara »underlines Ignacio Cembrero, but the Moroccan strategy did not manage to influence the positions of South Africa, Nigeria and – unsurprisingly – Algeria, three continental powers.

With France, whose relations were strained after the revelations of Moroccan wiretaps on French personalities via the Pegasus software, the climate has become stormy around Western Sahara: Rabat considers the positioning of Paris too ambiguous. While France was favorable in 2007 to the Moroccan proposal for an “autonomy” of the region within the framework of the sovereignty of Rabat, Mohammed VI summoned his allies, including Paris, to clarify “the substance of their positioning in a way that is unequivocal”. “The Sahara issue is the prism through which Morocco considers its international environment”, did he warn during a speech on August 20, 2022.

However, the attitude of Paris, which refuses to formally recognize Moroccan sovereignty over the territory – contenting itself with applauding the proposal for autonomy as “ a serious and credible basis for discussion” – is now considered outdated in Rabat. Especially after the reversal in March 2022 of Madrid, which, after having long shown a certain benevolence towards the demands of the Polisario, went very far in approving the Moroccan autonomy project, now praised as “the most serious and credible base” for the resolution of the conflict. Rabat expects France to use such a superlative (“the most serious basis”) instead of the indefinite article (“a serious foundation”) which acts as an official position in Paris.

Tourism, phosphate and fishing

But the other aspect of the Moroccan fight is in the field of the economy. Expenditure aimed at militarising, developing and exploiting the desert zone, in particular the tourist resource, is not yet profitable, however. “The Sahara costs much more than it brings inemphasizes Ignacio Cembrero. The civil servants sent there have a bonus, taxes are lower there and Morocco has made many economic efforts for this area. »

The exploitation of phosphate nevertheless allows it to be the second largest producer in the world, behind China. Its control of 1,100 km of coastline on the Atlantic gives it a monopoly on fisheries resources, although Rabat suffered a setback after the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled that the fishing agreement with the Twenty-Seven, which brought it an annual contribution of around 50 million euros, was illegal due to the status of Western Sahara. The deal expired on July 17.

However, Morocco does not intend to renounce any of its claims to this territory. The kingdom does not condition all of its relations on the question of Western Sahara, but this has now become the backbone of its diplomacy. And what does the anger and cold snaps that it can cause matter?