Chronic. “Reconquest”, for Eric Zemmour. “Restore the Nation” and “Restore the State”, for Marine Le Pen. And even “Rediscover French pride”, for Valérie Pécresse. At the end of a pre-campaign marked by the comparison of a glorious past and a miserable present, these slogans are set against the background of a deep-rooted economic and social pessimism: three of our fellow citizens out of four consider the countries in decline, two in three see globalization as a threat, six in ten – a little less, all the same, than five years ago – believe it necessary to repatriate the decision from Brussels to Paris, according to the 9e edition of “French fractures”, an Ipsos / Sopra Steria survey for The world, the Jean Jaurès Foundation and the Montaigne Institute, carried out from August 25 to 27.
With an unfortunately inaudible left and an Emmanuel Macron who speaks but does not say yet, nostalgia has invaded the last weeks. While Germany has just created a coalition whose themes are digitization, ecological transition and social inclusion, are we doomed to approach the coming election by looking backwards? In a country where the median voter is over 50 – if one takes into account abstention rates – it is tempting, of course, to attribute this regressive itching to the race for votes from frightened seniors. However, this would be to ignore the real foundations of collective concern.
At the turn of the century, France’s economic performance hardly differentiated it from its environment. A gross domestic product (GDP) per capita roughly equal to that of Germany, the same share of employed people in the working-age population, and identical public debt: even if Germany had not yet recovering from the shock of reunification, that was honorable. Of course, the Netherlands or Sweden did better. Of course, the whole of Europe remained isolated from the American productivity boom. But in the euro area, we were a middle country.
Delay clocks
Twenty years later, the situation is no longer the same. In 2019, our GDP per capita is 10% lower than that of Germany or Belgium, 20% lower than that of the Netherlands. For the employment rate, the gap between the two banks of the Rhine is 10 points – a deficit of 4 million jobs. And, for the public debt, the difference is 40 points. The dropout is not as pronounced as that of Italy, but it is clear. And, moreover, in certain aspects, it is even more marked: our external debt is thus much heavier.
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