New FIS security report – Disguised as refugees: Federal government warns of Russian spies – News


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The war in Ukraine dominated the work of the federal intelligence service in several areas in 2022, the annual report shows. The FIS sees Switzerland as a secret agent hotspot and considers the risk of terrorism to be increased.

According to the report, the espionage threat to Switzerland mainly comes from the intelligence services of Russia and China. In the case of Russia, the intelligence officers are often employees of embassies and consulates. They moved with diplomatic immunity, recruited and directed their sources.

A third of the embassy staff are agents

Many European countries expelled dozens of Russian diplomats last year. This is not known from Switzerland. The Federal Intelligence Service (NDB) now writes: Of the 220 people who work in the Russian representations in Geneva and Bern, around a third are probably working for Russian intelligence services, i.e. over 70.

According to the FIS, Switzerland is one of the countries in Europe in which the most members of the Russian intelligence service are deployed. This is also due to its role as a host country for numerous international organizations.

Across Europe, the work of Russian intelligence officials has been made more difficult, but the war is opening up new opportunities: intelligence services could use the flight movement to smuggle agents disguised as refugees to Europe. The FIS does not describe any specific cases in Switzerland.

In the outlook, the FIS writes that the Russian intelligence services would “very likely have more leeway” in Switzerland than in other western countries.

Cyber ​​attacks on critical infrastructure

In addition, the threat to critical infrastructures in Switzerland remains increased, writes the FIS. A threat in connection with the war against Ukraine remains “very unlikely”. One risk is “spillover effects”, such as cyber attacks in countries that support Ukraine and thus have an impact on Switzerland’s infrastructure. The FIS does not cite any examples, but it is conceivable that a power failure after a hacker attack in a neighboring country could lead to a large-scale network failure.

The activities of non-state actors involved in the war should not be underestimated. That is phrased diplomatically, probably meaning private hacker groups – on the part of Russia or Ukraine. Even if there are mostly financial motives behind cyber attacks, this does not rule out other motives such as power politics, writes the FIS. This is reminiscent of recent cyberattacks on federal agency websites.

Via front companies to Swiss armaments technology

The FIS put a focus on recognizing goods that the warring parties could use in favor of a sanctioned military use. That means: Ukraine and Russia should not be able to buy weapons or weapon parts in Switzerland, not even through covert channels.

This is exactly what Russia is apparently trying to do, as the FIS report shows: “Companies in the states of the Eurasian Economic Union [Armenien, Belarus, Kasachstan, Kirgistan, Russland / Anm. d. Red] are increasingly appearing as supposed end customers for goods that then go on to Russia.» Turkey and India are also used by private individuals, writes the FIS. The controls would therefore have to be expanded.

In addition to preventing proliferation in countries such as Iran and North Korea, Russia is now also dominating this FIS area. That should remain so for some time. The FIS is therefore also continuing a prevention program in which Swiss companies are sensitized.

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