After two weeks of war, Ukraine continues to put up fierce resistance against the Russian attackers. Joachim Weber, an expert on security policy at the University of Bonn, explains why Russia is still struggling to take control militarily and why a permanent occupation of the country is impossible. in the interview.
ntv.de: How likely is a victory for Russia?
Joachim Weber: I think Russia’s military victory is currently even more likely than the opposite, albeit with a significantly decreasing probability. Well, if I should express that in numbers, then I’m actually at the point where I can say: I still see a 55 percent development, maybe slowly moving towards 50 percent probability, which includes a victory for Russia.
Has Russia’s military capabilities been overestimated and Ukraine’s underestimated?
Yes, in principle everyone was wrong, including me. In any case, I have not yet found any well-known military or security policy experts in the world who have predicted the course of the war. The military successes that the Russian Federation has achieved so far in its war of aggression are modest given its vast superiority. There is no other way to put it.
The attacker actually has great advantages…
Yes, if he manages to keep his momentum. This means that if he not only has the initiative, but also keeps it and hits his shots quickly, powerfully and with concentration, this can lead to dramatic developments. An example is the German Blitzkrieg concept at the beginning of the Second World War. There was this sit-in war in the West, where you watched each other and didn’t do anything. And then came this massive German blow in the spring of 1940, which then defeated France within four weeks, which had not been achieved in four years in the First World War. If the Russians had tried that, it cannot be ruled out that they would have achieved such a military success. They obviously did everything wrong that could possibly be done wrong.
What exactly?
Russia grossly underestimated Ukraine’s defences, and appears to have been ill-prepared. They attacked at all points simultaneously and evenly instead of concentrating their forces. It probably also has something to do with the fact that the invasion was a decision by Putin’s smallest circle and this decision was not even passed on to the troops. That means that some of the soldiers were completely taken by surprise when they were told at the Ukrainian border that you would drive over there and shoot. All this led to the situation that the Russian offensive fizzled out.
What else is coming from Russia now?
We’re all a bit puzzled about that. We’ve been discussing this massive convoy for a long time now. I was very concerned the first day, and the second and third days as well. Sometime after the fifth or sixth day, the concern turned to irritation. If the attack of the first echelon has already penetrated, an even more powerful and faster strike should of course follow as soon as possible for military tactical reasons. But that hasn’t happened since then. At some point I asked myself whether the Russians were deliberately slowing down the advance in order to give politics another chance. But I quickly dismissed that as an improbable thesis. What Russia can certainly still do is cause tremendous damage and destruction.
But Russia can no longer achieve its original goals with this type of warfare?
Russian arsenals are full of guns of all kinds. They can destroy immovable targets, but will not defeat the structure of the Ukrainian armed forces. They are well distributed across the board, well camouflaged and can always get to safety from these attacks. If you want to defeat Ukraine, you have to advance on the ground, gain control of territory and, above all, permanently destroy the enemy’s forces. And the Russians don’t seem to be able to do that at the moment. We don’t know if they will ever succeed, that will have to be seen in the next few weeks.
Can Russia occupy Ukraine permanently?
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No, I can say that with 100% certainty. This military cannot do that. There is not enough power for that. With these 150,000 men, Russia basically has the entire army that is practically available. In today’s modern armies, for every ten people, one soldier fights, and the other nine do things like combat support, repairs and maintenance, logistics, and supplies. 150,000 men is a formidable force even for an army of over a million soldiers. Military districts have already been laid bare for this purpose, and troops have been carted in from other regions. Russia will no longer be able to increase this significantly without making itself extremely vulnerable in other areas. And with those 150,000 men, Ukraine will never be subdued.
How many people would it take?
If you want to hold a subjugated area permanently and pacify it according to your ideas, you need about 20 people for every 1000 inhabitants. The Russians currently have three to three and a half soldiers for every 1,000 Ukrainians. And then we’re talking about a country where they’re going to be shot in the back from every open window, where their food is poisoned, where their vehicle is set on fire at night, where all kinds of terrible things happen to them because the people hate them and them want to expel from this country. Russia will never be able to permanently occupy Ukraine and incorporate it into its dominion by force. Russia also does not have the financial strength to occupy these areas for decades. In this respect, Putin’s plan to reconstruct the historical Russian zone of influence has already failed miserably.
What does this mean for the further course of the war?
Joachim Weber is an expert on security and foreign policy at the University of Bonn’s Cassis Institute.
(Photo: University of Bonn)
The Russian leadership is currently in Moscow considering very carefully how to proceed. A first cautious indication of this is the beginning of the very cautious abandonment of war aims. In my opinion, the sanctions imposed by the West are very effective. They can’t turn the tide in days or weeks, but in a few months, at the latest in a few years, the Russian economy will be dead and the country bankrupt. Then we have a completely isolated country that can only lean on the Chinese for better or for worse and, as a junior partner in this alliance, is allowed to deliver raw materials and from which money can feed its people. That’s the perspective. Russia must now experience a rendezvous with reality.
This means?
You have to consider how to maneuver yourself out of this position. When the Russians get to that point, there is hope that diplomacy will come. And I would like to advise everyone to build a bridge for the Russians.
That’s what German politicians, some of them very high-ranking, have been doing for years.
Then let me sharpen the usage. It’s not about détente and change through rapprochement. Let’s put it in the language of diplomacy: you have to define the “off-ramp”. Putin started this war, went up the ramp and started the shooting, but now has to come down halfway face-saving. This is what international crisis diplomacy calls “off-ramp.” We have to work on that, that’s what this formulation means.
A victory for Ukraine is out of the question?
That’s a matter of definition. In my view, it is a victory for Ukraine when it has asserted itself and successfully resisted submission. There will be no invasion of Ukraine into Russia with a victorious final battle in Moscow and Putin one who will be expelled. That means it’s about forcing the Russians to leave this attacked state again. War damage and the resulting reparation payments will also have to be discussed, but some political price will have to be paid so that Putin doesn’t spend months trying to downsize the cities, as Russia did in Grozny or Aleppo. There is no point in playing fantasies and believing that the Russians can be humiliated, thrown in the dust. We will not experience that and we should not strive for it.
What could a solution realistically look like?
That’s exactly the difficulty. It’s a big dilemma, because both warring parties want to achieve success, in principle they have to get more than they had before. But both can no longer get it, which is mutually exclusive. It will depend on diplomatic skill. From Moscow’s point of view, the key points are the question of Ukraine’s membership in NATO and the continued permanent control of Crimea. I am afraid that these two points will be non-negotiable for Russia. If Ukraine – as Zelenskyi had already indicated – manages to give in at this point, then it may be able to save almost its entire territory, with or without Donbass. One should not close oneself off to a solution that might end up being a solution that the country sets up in terms of security policy along the lines of Switzerland, for example. However, with better guarantees than the Budapest Memorandum offered.
Kevin Schulte spoke to Joachim Weber