THEhe Taliban movement won the war and, in the absence of credible opposition, we will have to come to terms with this regime by setting our red lines and our negotiating objectives, without guarantee of success, but with a chance to influence its practice of to be able to. At this very moment, negotiations are focused on extending the deadline for the evacuation of threatened foreigners and Afghans.
The military victory of the Taliban movement raises more generally the question of the attitude of Western countries towards the government which is being put in place. For now, the transition, less violent than in 1996 and 2001, is marked by the collapse without much fighting of a discredited regime and by the humiliation of Western governments, unable to foresee an evacuation plan.
While a policy of banishing Afghanistan is taking shape, it seems to us, on the contrary, that the moment is ripe for the opening of negotiations with the regime in formation insofar as, now in power, the Taliban movement is paradoxically in a situation of weakness. Contrary to a view that is now widespread, Western countries therefore have the means to influence the development of the new regime, in particular in the area of human rights and security.
Indeed, the Taliban have built their return to power on their ability to rebuild public services, thus responding to a state demand ignored for two decades. They took root in the countryside by establishing Islamic courts, the impartiality of which contrasted with the widespread corruption of the judiciary, if not their absence in many places. Getting the administration back on track is the Taliban’s current priority as they seek to bring civil servants back to their posts, hence the amnesties for those who worked with the old regime and NGOs. They announced, for example, that the minister of health and the mayor of Kabul could remain in place.
Conciliatory tone
However, the Taliban movement does not have the means to circumvent the financial obstacle which stands before it in the reconstruction of the State. The coffers are empty: the massive embezzlement of the Afghan political class has led to financial bankruptcy, while Afghanistan is also going through an unprecedented economic depression since the withdrawal of most of the NATO forces in 2014 The historic drought that has raged for several years also explains why certain regions are at risk of food shortages, which will result in massive departures to cities or abroad. Food aid is therefore urgently needed.
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