“The Sino-Russian partnership has become an ideological and security axis of which democracies are the main targets”

Lhe Chinese government seems increasingly worried about the turn of events in Ukraine. The Russian invasion is far from being the expected success. The economic consequences of the war are being felt everywhere, including in China. At the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, in September 2022, Xi Jinping publicly expressed his concern to Vladimir Putin. The partnership ” without limits “ between the two powers isn’t it coming up against its own limits?

Clearly, there are limits to the Sino-Russian partnership. But these are very modest compared to the broad common interests that bring Beijing and Moscow together. Here is the inventory that we can make of it: China did not approve the special operation of Russia. It has remained neutral at the UN and elsewhere. It did not recognize the annexation of Crimea by Moscow in 2014, nor will it recognize that of Donbass and other Ukrainian territories where Putin has just organized a charade of referendums.

Also read the column: Article reserved for our subscribers “China loves Russia, but a weakened and demanding Russia”

In Central Asia, Xi Jinping has also strengthened his partnership with Kazakhstan, whose new president, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, is openly worried about the possible repercussions of the invasion of Ukraine on his country, an immense territory including the North remains largely inhabited by Russian populations. And the Chinese leader is advancing his pawns in this part of the former Soviet Union, having managed to persuade Putin to lift his veto on the construction of a new railway line which should link China to Iran, via Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, bypassing the Russian corridor to Europe. Sino-Central Asian trade has also long been larger than Russian-Central Asian trade, boosted by exports of Turkmen natural gas and Kazakh oil as well as Chinese sales of equipment and consumer goods.

Partnership stronger than ever

Finally, Beijing has not completely cut ties with kyiv. Before the war, the two capitals had developed fruitful political and commercial relations. Today, the Chinese government maintains a fairly dense channel of communication with President Zelensky, particularly worried about Taiwan’s diplomatic activism in Eastern Europe.

The war in Ukraine is not in the interest of China, which hopes, if not for a quick conclusion, at least for a ceasefire in a fairly short time. Xi Jinping said this to Putin knowing full well that he can hardly influence the latter’s objectives or strategy.

You have 56.69% of this article left to read. The following is for subscribers only.

source site-29