HASAfter three decades of existence, the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh [Haut-Karabakh] sank. Following a victorious war in the fall of 2020, then a long blockade, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliev, has just dealt a blow to this secessionist republic, which is returning to the internationally recognized borders of Azerbaijan. Already, the majority of the populations of this region, historically and demographically Armenian, have fled to the motherland.
We can, rightly, cry treason on the part of Moscow, whose interposition force did not enforce the terms of the ceasefire, the brief Azerbaijani offensive of September 19 and 20 having encountered no opposition. Russian. Should we see in this the desire to punish the Armenian government, too democratic and turned towards the West, and to secure the favors of Baku?
In addition to the political-mafia relations that Russian factions cultivate there, Azerbaijan’s good will in fact conditions various projects for north/south logistical axes, between Russia and Iran, towards the Arab-Persian Gulf and of the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, the Russian armed forces are monopolized by the war in Ukraine, and Moscow no longer has the means to control the Caucasus and, east of the Caspian, Central Asia.
However, the Western powers would have wrong to give in to satisfaction, in the face of what looks like a weakening of Russia. First, because this is perhaps only temporary: the Russian withdrawal will depend on the fate of the weapons in Ukraine and therefore on the constancy of support for kyiv. Baku’s offensive marks the diplomatic failure of Paris and Washington, who had tried to extract guarantees for the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh. On the ground, brute force will have prevailed.
Preventing the spread of chaos
Beyond that, it is feared that Azerbaijani geopolitical ambitions are not limited to the Nagorno-Karabakh region. In fact, Aliev, with the support of his Turkish ally, is loudly demanding the opening of an axis of circulation, the Zanguezour corridor, in Siounik, that is to say the south of Armenia. The challenge is to connect Azerbaijan to the enclave of Nakhchivan, under the sovereignty of Baku.
Baku’s choice of the term “corridor” is not trivial. The idea would be to control this axis of circulation, which would mean a loss of sovereignty for Yerevan over southern Armenia. Seen from Ankara, this territorial junction would open a direct link between Turkey, the Caspian basin and Central Asia: an Altaic geopolitics against a backdrop of pan-Turkism. We must also mention the desires for Eastern Armenia, considered by some to be Western Azerbaijan.
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