Grandstand. On the eve of his departure for Moscow, Emmanuel Macron affirmed that “the intensity of the dialogue we have had with Russia” was likely to ” to prevent “ an offensive against Ukraine. We would like to have the certainties of the President of the Republic. No one can claim to know what Vladimir Putin wants, and he may not have decided what he is going to do yet.
We sometimes hear that the Russian President “play chess”. But it is much more a game of poker being played on the borders of Europe. And in this game, it is fundamental to discourage in advance a coup against Ukraine.
This deterrence encounters two difficulties.
The first is what is called “the asymmetry of the stakes”. For Moscow, the fate of Ukraine is by nature a huge issue that affects the very future of Russian power and the legacy that Mr. Putin will leave behind. For Westerners, this is a major issue for European security, but not existential.
The second is that Mr. Putin probably considers himself to be in a position of strength. Its army is more efficient and better trained than it was ten years ago. He secured his control of Belarus, valuable for the military encirclement of Ukraine. And reconstituted its foreign exchange reserves, which allows it to approach possible sanctions in a good position. Opposite, the Westerners are perceived as weak, America being especially interested in Asia and Europe being, especially in winter, very dependent on Russian gas. And the previous sanctions, especially after the annexation of Crimea, remained bearable for the Kremlin.
It was therefore logical to promise sanctions “massive”, as proposed by France in mid-November. A language adopted by our allies and partners ever since. But that comes up against a problem well known to early Cold War strategists. At the time, we were indeed promising “massive nuclear retaliation” to the aggressor. However, is it credible vis-à-vis the latter to threaten him with such a fate in the event of a limited attack? President Biden, clumsily, publicly acknowledged this on January 19, referring to a situation in which Moscow was carrying out “a minor incursion that would lead us to argue about what to do or what not to do”. Before stepping back and specifying that “any Russian unit crossing the border” would be considered to fall under “the invasion”…
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