Military expert on the Ukraine war: “First Putin was in shock, then the West”

Russia’s war against Ukraine is at a point “where industrial capacity decides whether victory or defeat,” says Danish military expert Anders Puck Nielsen in an interview with ntv.de. “If the West decides to support Ukraine, then it seems pretty clear to me that Russia will lose this attrition and production competition in the long run.” The problem is that there is currently a lack of political will – even in the USA. Germany is also “still holding back on delivering offensive capabilities that would enable Ukraine to end the war.” Nevertheless, Nielsen sees reason for cautious optimism.

ntv.de: You recently mentioned it pointed outthat the war between Hamas and Israel is currently receiving significantly more attention than the Russian war against Ukraine. Does that still apply?

Anders Puck Nielsen: Yes, I think that’s definitely the case. The situation in Gaza still gets much more attention than Ukraine. I also notice it personally: Since the beginning of October, I have hardly received any inquiries about Ukraine. Journalists are mainly interested in commenting on the events in Gaza. This still applies.

Isn’t it understandable that the media and public are more interested in a war that is new?

Yes, that’s the nature of reporting: media reports on what’s happening. And at the moment, events in Israel are moving much faster than in Ukraine. Nevertheless, it is important that we do not forget Ukraine and that the lack of attention does not result in the redirection of political resources from Ukraine to Israel.

Is it a problem for Ukraine that the Hamas-Israel war is, to a certain extent, overshadowing the Russian war of aggression?

The problem arises because this is happening at a time when we in the West are having a discussion about war weariness and prospects – that is, about what strategy the West is pursuing to help Ukraine in the long term. Countries like Hungary, and now also Slovakia, are very skeptical about supporting Ukraine. The USA is obviously currently unable to secure funding for aid to Ukraine for the next year. And this discussion comes after a Ukrainian summer offensive that was, in the eyes of many observers, a disappointment. Now the question arises as to how realistic it is that Ukraine can win the war, which in turn raises the question of whether it is worth investing in this project.

When we spoke in March, you said it looked like Russia was losing the war. The general mood now seems to be much more pessimistic.

I’m still cautiously optimistic. If the West decides to support Ukraine, then it seems pretty clear to me that Russia will lose this attrition and production competition in the long run. The combined gross domestic product of Western Europe and North America far exceeds Russia’s GDP. So we wouldn’t even have to invest a large part of our GDP in supporting Ukraine and would still clearly outperform Russia.

Essentially, this is where we are now: we are in a phase of war where industrial capacity determines whether we win or lose. But this requires political will. Particularly with regard to the United States, one may be concerned whether this will is sufficiently present. So I see room for pessimism if a large country like the USA is suddenly no longer able to keep its promises.

Oleksiy Melnyk, a Ukrainian military expert, says the West is still afraid of a Ukrainian victory or a Russian defeat. Is that an accurate description?

Yes I believe that too. Especially at the beginning of the war, there were a lot of political signals that we were shoulder to shoulder with Ukraine and things like that. But as time goes on, it is becoming increasingly clear that the West, at least some countries in the West, do not necessarily have the same priorities as Ukraine. Western countries are committed to the continued existence of a free and independent Ukraine, but restoring Ukraine’s 1991 borders is not necessarily their priority. Many Western capitals still appear to be looking for a way out for Putin to avoid defeating Russia on the battlefield. This is primarily about fears of escalation, but it also shows that there are different understandings of the situation in the West and in Kiev.

In what way?

In Ukraine the focus is much more on actual victory. I have heard Ukrainians say several times: I want this fight to end so that my children don’t have to fight the same war. This means that if this war is not finally decided and Russia does not lose enough, then in a few years there will be a new war. Ukrainians want this to end once and for all.

Who exactly do you have in mind when you describe politicians in Western capitals as too hesitant?

There are some states that are more committed than others, such as the Baltic countries, Great Britain or my country, Denmark. Countries like Germany are more hesitant. The Federal Republic primarily supplies air defense weapons and to Ukraine – things that ensure that Ukraine continues to exist. But Germany is still holding back on delivering offensive capabilities that would allow Ukraine to end the war. I still don’t know why Germany doesn’t provide Taurus missiles. But you can also point to the USA. It is becoming increasingly clear that the Biden administration is not necessarily eager to provide Ukraine with the things that would enable it to achieve major offensive successes. As a rule, too little comes too late.

One could argue that the West may have an interest in supporting Ukraine, but that our interests are not identical to those of Ukraine.

I would object to this on two points. First, giving Ukraine just enough to continue the war but not enough to end it is a humanitarian problem. Because this also increases the number of civilian victims. And second, we must understand that Russia represents a long-term threat not only to Ukraine, but to the entire Western alliance. From the Russian perspective, it’s not just about a small piece of land in eastern Ukraine, but about much more.

Is this not understood in the West?

I think not enough. There is a tendency to misunderstand what the Russians are fighting for in this war. As long as this misunderstanding exists, we will make assumptions about Russia’s goals that are simply not true. If we do not recognize that Russia will be a long-term problem for the West, then we will be unprepared for what may come next. Russia’s aim is to test the cohesion of NATO and to weaken the Western alliance to such an extent that we no longer know whether the USA would help us if it were necessary. If we find ourselves in such a situation, then Russia will be the dominant player in Europe. The best way to deal with this challenge would be to ensure that the Russians do not succeed in Ukraine. Otherwise they might develop an appetite for more.

Another question about the course of the war: How do you assess the situation on the Dnipro near Kherson, where Ukraine was able to establish its first bridgeheads on the southern side of the bank?

You have to put this into a larger framework. At the beginning of the invasion, the Russian side had the idea of ​​a blitzkrieg with a quick victory after a few days. When that didn’t happen, the political leadership in Russia was obviously in something of a shock. There were these pictures of Putin shaking and speculation that he was sick. In fact, it was probably more of a nervous breakdown because he had to deal with the fact that the quick war wasn’t working. The Russians realized that this war would last a while and that they would have to prepare to fight it for many years. The Russian economy has since undergone many of the changes necessary for a long war. A large part of Russia’s GDP now flows into the defense sector, and the production of military goods has increased significantly.

Ironically, a similar shift also occurred in the West, but also in Ukraine itself. The summer offensive was expected to be a major breakthrough, almost a decision, an end to the war. What we are experiencing now in the West seems to me a bit similar to the time when Putin was in shock and didn’t know what to do. And we also have to realize now that this is a long road. It’s a long, hard war.

And Kherson?

What we are seeing in the Kherson region is very interesting because it sort of draws the contours of what Ukraine can do to change the dynamics of the war in the long term. The bridgeheads on the other side of the Dnipro can open a new front. The strange thing about the current front profile is that although it is very long, it is also quite compact at the same time. The front actually extends for around 1000 kilometers. But the Dnipro forms the front for almost half and no major fighting takes place there. If Ukraine manages to establish itself in the Kherson region on the southern side of the river, it would effectively more or less double the front line. That could make 2024 very different than 2023 – or it could be something that impacts 2025. Other initiatives by Ukraine that can change the dynamics of the war are its attacks in depth that target Russian logistics. That’s why it’s so frustrating that a country like Germany doesn’t supply the missiles that Ukraine needs.

Hubertus Volmer spoke to Anders Puck Nielsen